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ELLERTH AND FARAGHER: TOWARDS STRICT
EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII FOR
SUPERVISORY SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Steven M. Warshawskyt
During the 1997-98 term, the Supreme Court issued two important
rulings substantially expanding the scope of an employer's vicarious
liability under Title VIIt for a supervisor's sexual harassment of a
subordinate employee. In both Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth2 and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,3 the Court held that an employer is liable
under Title VII for a sexually hostile work environment created by a
supervisor unless the employer proves not only that it exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct the harassing behavior, but also that the
victimized employee unreasonably failed to utilize any grievance
mechanisms provided by the employer "or to avoid harm otherwise.' 4
Since the employer's affirmative defense will be defeated anytime the
harassed employee properly reports the supervisor's conduct and does not
unreasonably contribute to his or her own victimization, the Court's
decisions in Ellerth and Faragher move far towards adopting a rule of
strict employer liability whenever sexual harassment is perpetrated by a
supervisor. While strict liability has always been the standard in cases of
quid pro quo sexual harassment,5 it represents a marked departure from the
i J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1997; M.Ed., Vanderbilt University,
1992; A.B., Princeton University, 1990. I would like to thank the Honorable Paul V.
Niemeyer of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the Honorable
Catherine C. Blake of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland for
giving me the invaluable opportunity these past two years to learn about the law under their
expert tutelage.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
2. 524 U.S. 742, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
3. 524U.S. 775, 118S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
4. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93.
5. See infra note 35.
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prior law governing cases of hostile work environment sexual harassment,
which generally required the employee to prove that the employer had been
negligent before liability would be imposed.6
This note analyzes the Supreme Court's decisions in Ellerth and
Faragher and sets forth the current law governing claims of supervisory
sexual harassment under Title VII. Part I explains the distinction between
quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile work environment sexual
harassment, and then describes the rules recently articulated by the Court
for holding an employer liable under either theory. Part II then applies
these rules to the facts of two representative cases to illustrate the
significant changes that the Court has made to existing Title VII principles.
The note concludes with a short summary of the main points. I leave it to
other commentators to explore more fully the legal and political
implications of the Court's decisions.
I. THE LAW OF SUPERVISORY SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's.., sex.' 7 This
prohibition applies to all businesses with fifteen or more employees that are
"engaged in an industry affecting commerce,"8 and covers the actions of an
employer's "agent" as well as those of the employer itself.9 In Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,'0 the Supreme Court's first sexual
harassment case, the Court made clear that sexual harassment constitutes
discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.1 In identifying
the circumstances in which an employer will be held liable for the sexually
harassing behavior of its employees, the Court explained that, "Congress
wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this area."' 2 The
Meritor Court declined, however, "to issue a definitive rule on employer
liability," except to hold that under Title VII employers are not
6. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). The antidiscriminatory provisions of Title VII
were originally adopted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 § 703.
The provision relating to sex-based discrimination was added to the statute "at the last
minute" and, consequently, there is "little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the
Act's prohibition against discrimination based on 'sex."' Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
9. See id.
10. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
11. Id. at 64 ("Without question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate
because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex.")
(alteration in original).
12. Id. at 72.
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"automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors." 3
A. Categories of Sexual Harassment
Traditionally, two forms of workplace sexual harassment have been
held by courts to constitute sex discrimination in violation of Title VII: (1)
"quid pro quo" sexual harassment, in which an employee's supervisor
"link[s] tangible job benefits to the acceptance or rejection of sexual
advances"; 14 and (2) "hostile work environment" sexual harassment, in
which an individual's fellow employees engage in sexually-oriented
conduct that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment."' 5 In
Ellerth16 and Faragher,17 the Supreme Court clarified the distinction
between these two types of sexual harassment and articulated a new rule
governing when an employer will be held liable for a supervisor's sexual
harassment of a subordinate employee. This note will focus primarily upon
the Court's decision in Ellerth, which offers a more comprehensive
treatment of employer liability under Title VII.
The question presented in Ellerth was "[w]hether a claim of quid pro
quo sexual harassment may be stated under Title VII... where the plaintiff
employee has neither submitted to the sexual advances of the alleged
harasser nor suffered any tangible effects on the compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment as a consequence of a refusal to
submit to those advances."' 8  The plaintiff in Ellerth had worked as a
salesperson for Burlington Industries in Chicago. After voluntarily quitting
her job, she brought suit under Title VII alleging that during a fourteen-
month period she had been subjected to constant sexual harassment by her
second-line supervisor.
For purposes of its opinion, the Court assumed that the supervisor's
harassment included "numerous threats to retaliate against [the plaintiff] if
she denied some sexual liberties."' 9 Despite the harassment, the plaintiff
13. Id.
14. Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Hicks v.
Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th Cir. 1987) ("Quid pro quo harassment occurs
when submission to sexual conduct is made a condition of concrete employment benefits.").
15. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (internal punctuation and citation omitted)); see also
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1999) ("Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when ...
such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.").
16. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
17. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
18. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2265.
19. Id. at 2264.
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received a promotion during her tenure at Burlington and suffered no
reductions in her salary, benefits, or job responsibilities as a result of her
refusal to submit to her supervisor's advances.20  Nonetheless, she
contended that "[w]here a supervisor makes some form of contingent threat
to facilitate an act of sexual harassment, a statutory violation occurs. 21
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Ellerth, began his analysis
by distinguishing between quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile work
environment sexual harassment.22 Although Justice Kennedy considered
the labels "quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment" to be "of limited
utility" in determining an employer's vicarious liability for a supervisor's
sexual harassment of a subordinate employee.2' he found them "relevant
when there is a threshold question whether a plaintiff can prove
discrimination in violation of Title VII.' '24 According to Justice Kennedy,'
the terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment" "illustrate the
distinction between cases involving a threat which is carried out and
offensive conduct in general. '' 5 Thus, quid pro quo sexual harassment
occurs only when a supervisor's threats to retaliate against an employee for
rejecting the supervisor's sexual advances are carried out.26 On the other
20. See id. at 2262.
21. Respondent's Brief at 52, Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998)
(No. 97-569).
22. SeeEllerth, 118 S. Ct. at2264.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2265. A number of commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court's
decisions in Ellerth and Faragher eliminated the analytical distinction between quid pro quo
sexual harassment and hostile work environment sexual harassment. See, e.g., Anita K.
Blair, Harassment Law: More Confused Than Ever, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1998, at A14;
Editorial, More Harassment, WASH. POST, June 28, 1998, at C6. This is an inaccurate
reading of the Court's opinions. As the Court in Ellerth explained, before an employer may
be held liable to an employee victimized by sexual harassment, the court must first
determine that an actionable Title VII violation occurred. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2265.
Title VII is violated either when a supervisor engages in quid pro quo sexual harassment or
when an employee is subjected to a sexually hostile work environment. See id. at 2264-65.
Moreover, once the court finds an actionable Title VII violation, the type of violation that
occurred determines whether any affirmative defense is available to the employer. See infra
Part II.B-C. Though no defense is available in situations of quid pro quo sexual harassment,
a limited defense is available in situations of hostile work environment sexual harassment.
See id. Thus, the categories "quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment" remain crucial
to understanding employer liability under Title VII.
25. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2265.
26. See id. at 2264-65. The Ellerth Court's definition of quid pro quo sexual
harassment, which does not include a supervisor's unfulfilled threats to retaliate against an
employee for refusing his sexual advances, represents a sharp departure from the position
previously taken by a majority of the federal circuit courts that addressed the issue. See,
e.g., Jansen v. Packaging Corp., 123 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) ("[L]iability for
quid pro quo harassment is strict even if the supervisor's threat does not result in a company
act."), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257
(1998); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1297 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that
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hand, situations in which such threats are not carried out or are absent
altogether, but in which the employee experiences "bothersome attentions
or sexual remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive," constitute
hostile work environment sexual harassment.27 Because the plaintiff's
sexual harassment claim in Ellerth "involve[d] only unfulfilled threats,"
Justice Kennedy concluded that "it should be categorized as a hostile work
environment claim which requires a showing of severe or pervasive
conduct." s Faragher, likewise, was a hostile work environment case.
29
B. Employer Liability for Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
The Court in Ellerth made clear that an employer will be held
vicariously liable under Title VII for both quid pro quo and hostile work
30environment sexual harassment committed by a supervisor. In order to
hold an employer liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment, a plaintiff
employee must prove that "a tangible employment action resulted from a
refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands."31 Justice Kennedy
defined "a tangible employment action"' as "a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits. 32 In addition, a tangible employment action
"requires an official act of the enterprise" and generally "is documented in
official company records, and may be subject to review by higher level
quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs "even if the supervisor does not follow through on
his or her threat"); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[A] supervisor's
intertwining of a request for the performance of sexual favors with a discussion of actual or
potential job benefits or detriments in a single conversation constitutes quid pro quo sexual
harassment."); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1559-60 (1 lth Cir.
1987) (finding that quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when the supervisor "threaten[s]
to make decisions affecting the employment status of his subordinates"). But see Gary v.
Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim
for quid pro quo sexual harassment when the supervisor's numerous threats "were not
carried out").
27. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2264.
28. Id. at 2265 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 118 S.
Ct. 998, 1002-03 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
29. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2280 (1998). The plaintiff in
Faragher alleged that she had been subjected to a sexually hostile work environment by her
supervisors while working as a life guard for the City of Boca Raton. See id. at 2280-81.
30. SeeEllerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2264.
31. Id. at2265.
32. Id. at 2268. As discussed supra note 26 and accompanying text, quid pro quo
sexual harassment does not occur when a supervisor merely threatens to take a tangible
employment action against a subordinate employee who refuses to submit to the
supervisor's sexual demands.
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supervisors. 33 The Ellerth Court then found, based on standard agency
principles, that "a tangible employment action taken by the supervisor
becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the employer. 34 It necessarily
follows that when an employee suffers a tangible employment action in
retaliation for his or her refusal to agree to a supervisor's sexual demands,
the employer will be held strictly liable. 5
The Supreme Court in Ellerth broke little new ground in the area of
quid pro quo sexual harassment. Strict employer liability for a supervisor's
quid pro quo sexual harassment has been a longstanding principle of Title
VII law.36 The Court in Ellerth did, however, somewhat narrow the scope
of an employer's liability for a supervisor's quid pro quo sexual harassment
by emphasizing that threats alone are not a sufficient basis for holding an
employer strictly liable for the supervisor's behavior.
C. Employer Liability for Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment
In contrast to the Court's holdings on quid pro quo harassment, in both
Ellerth and Faragher the Court substantially expanded the circumstances in
which an employer will be held liable for a sexually hostile work
environment created by a supervisor. The new rule pertaining to a
supervisor's hostile work environment sexual harassment is as follows:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized
33. Id. at 2269.
34. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1957). As Justice
Kennedy explained, "[tIangible employment actions fall within the special province of the
supervisor... [and] are the means by which the supervisor brings the official power of the
enterprise to bear on subordinates." Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2269.
35. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2269 (explaining that in such circumstances "it would be
implausible to interpret agency principles to allow an employer to escape liability"). The
basic rationale for strict liability in the quid pro quo context is that because the employer
delegated part of the company's power to the supervisor, it is appropriate to hold the
employer liable for the supervisor's misuse of this power. See, e.g., Carerro v. New York
City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[I]n quid pro quo cases the harassing
employee acts as and for the company, holding out the employer's benefits as an
inducement to the employee for sexual favors. Accordingly ... the employer is held strictly
liable for its employee's unlawful acts.").
One implication of the Ellerth Court's definition of quid pro quo sexual harassment is
that if the harassed employee submits to the supervisor's sexual demands and consequently
does not suffer any tangible employment actions, he or she will not have a claim for quid
pro quo sexual harassment. Of course, the employee still may have a claim for hostile work
environment sexual harassment. See infra note 42 (setting forth applicable standards).
Furthermore, although the harassing supervisor cannot be sued directly under Title VII, he
or she may be held accountable under state tort law. See generally Lissau v. Southern Food
Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1998).
36. See, e.g., Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Mgt. Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986);
Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 604-06 (7th Cir. 1985); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251,
255 n.6 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (1 lth Cir. 1982).
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employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a
supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over
the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability
or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the
evidence .... The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer
or to avoid harm otherwise.
Thus, where an employee is subjected to a sexually hostile work
environment by his or her immediate or successively higher supervisor,"
under Ellerth and Faragher the employer is liable for the supervisor's
conduct unless the employer proves by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) that the employer took reasonable care to prevent and promptly remedy
the abusive situation, and (2) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to pursue available disciplinary measures or otherwise avoid the
harassment. No such defense to liability is available, however, where the
supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action
against the employee.39
37. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
38. In neither Ellerth nor Faragher did the Court expressly define what it meant by the
term "supervisor." Justice Kennedy's opinion in Ellerth, however, suggests that a
supervisor is someone who is authorized by the employer to take tangible employment
actions against other employees. As Justice Kennedy stated, "Tangible employment actions
fall within the special province of the supervisor." Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2269. Recall that a
"tangible employment action" is any "significant change in employment status, such as
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities,
or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Id. at 2268. Thus, under Justice
Kennedy's definition, merely being a step higher in the corporate hierarchy or having some
limited managerial duties is not enough to transform an employee into a "supervisor" for
Title VII purposes. A majority of federal circuit courts have taken a position in accord with
Justice Kennedy's view. See, e.g., Parkins v. Civil Constructors, Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1033-
34 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[I]t is manifest that the essence of supervisory status is the
authority to affect the terms and conditions of the victim's employment. This authority
primarily consists of the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an
employee.") (citing cases). But see Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76
(1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("A supervisor's responsibilities do not begin and end with
the power to hire, fire, and discipline employees, or with the power to recommend such
actions. Rather, a supervisor is charged with the day-to-day supervision of the work
environment and with ensuring a safe, productive workplace.").
39. Furthermore, no defense to liability is available if the harassing employee holds a
sufficiently high position in the corporate hierarchy. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267 (noting
that the employer is liable "where the agent's high rank in the company makes him or her
the employer's alter ego"); Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2284 (stating that a company president
"was indisputably within that class of an employer organization's officials who may be
treated as the organization's proxy" for purposes of Title VII liability); see also Cross v.
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This new hostile work environment liability standard represents a
significant change in the existing case law. Prior to Ellerth and Faragher,
a majority of the federal circuit courts imposed liability on an employer for
a sexually hostile work environment created by a supervisor only if the
plaintiff employee proved that the employer had been negligent in failing to
prevent or remedy the supervisor's unlawful conduct. So long as the
employer took prompt and appropriate steps to stop any supervisory
harassment of which it was or should have been aware, no Title VII
liability would attach. 40  A few circuit courts also imposed liability
whenever a supervisor explicitly used his delegated authority to carry out
his harassment of a subordinate employee, for example, by threatening to
fire or demote an employee who refused to accommodate his harassing
behavior.4' No circuit court went so far, however, as to hold that employers
are presumptively liable under Title VII for all sexual harassment
perpetrated by supervisors, subject only to an affirmative defense that
effectively places an employer's fate in the hands of the victimized
employee.
Under Ellerth and Faragher, once the plaintiff employee establishes
the existence of an actionable hostile work environment created by a
supervisor,42 the burden shifts to the employer to prove not only that it
Cleaver, 142 F.3d 1059, 1074 (8th Cir. 1998) ("[The retaliator could be so high in the
employer's hierarchy that.., the retaliatory conduct would necessarily be imputed to the
employer"); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[A]n employer will be
held liable [if]. . . the supervisor was at a sufficiently high level in the company."); Andrade
v. Mayfair Mgmt., Inc., 88 F.3d 258, 261 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[Iln situations where a
proprietor, partner or corporate officer participates personally in the harassing behavior, the
illegal conduct will be deemed to be that of the employer.") (internal punctuation and
citation omitted); Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 1994) ("There
is intuitive appeal to imposing liability for the torts of high-level executives because they
may speak for the company whenever they open their mouths.").
40. See, e.g., Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 138 F.3d 733, 737 (8th Cir. 1998); Jansen v.
Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (no majority opinion),
affd on other grounds sub nom. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998);
Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 437 (1st Cir. 1997); Andrade v.
Mayfair Management, Inc., 88 F.3d 258, 261 (4th Cir. 1996); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503,
508 (9th Cir. 1994); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 184-85 (6th Cir. 1992);
Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714,720 (5th Cir. 1986).
41. See, e.g., Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 635 (2d Cir. 1997); Harrison v. Eddy
Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1446 (10th Cir. 1997); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111
F.3d 1530, 1537 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
42. As explained in Faragher, to be actionable under Title VII, a sexually hostile work
environment "must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so."
Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2283 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993)).
While individual plaintiffs may consider a wide range of supervisory comments and conduct
"offensive," the crux of the inquiry is whether a "reasonable" or "objective" person in the
plaintiffs situation would find the behavior offensive. In making this reasonableness
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exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct the harassing behavior, but
also that the victimized employee "unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise.'"'  Regarding the first prong of the employer's
affirmative defense, the Supreme Court cautioned that "an anti-harassment
policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a
matter of law."44  Nonetheless, prudent employers will find it in their
interest to adopt formal sexual harassment policies that are communicated
clearly and frequently to all employees, that inform employees that sexual
harassment will not be tolerated, that encourage victims of sexual
harassment to come forward but do not require that they complain to the
offending supervisor, that provide for an impartial investigation of all
sexual harassment complaints, and that impose appropriate sanctions on
supervisors found guilty of sexual harassment.5
determination, courts and juries are to "look[] at all the circumstances." Id. These include:
the "frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee's work performance." Id. The Court in Faragher emphasized
that "conduct must be extreme" to constitute hostile work environment sexual harassment in
violation of Title VII. Id. at 2284. "[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated
incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 'terms
and conditions of employment."' Id. at 2283 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998)); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
67 (1986) ("For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or
pervasive...").
Additionally, in both Ellerth and Faragher, the Court clearly endorsed the view that
supervisors are in a unique position to harass their subordinates, and that this circumstance
justifies greater scrutiny-and stricter employer liability-under Title VII. See, e.g.,
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2269-70 ("a supervisor's power and authority invests his or her
harassing conduct with particular threatening character"); Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2289-90
("supervisors have special authority enhancing their capacity to harass"). As the Court in
Faragher explained: "When a person with supervisory authority discriminates in the terms
and conditions of subordinates' employment, his actions necessarily draw upon his superior
position over the people who report to him, or those under him, whereas an employee
generally cannot check a supervisor's abusive conduct the same way that she might deal
with abuse from a co-worker." Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2291 (emphasis added). Viewed
from this perspective, conduct which would not be perceived as unlawful sexual harassment
if engaged in by an ordinary employee is much more likely to be deemed actionable if
committed by a supervisor. The Court thus appears to be indicating that the degree of
"severity" or "pervasiveness" of misconduct required to find actionable sexual harassment
under Title VII is less in cases where a supervisor is involved than where the harassment is
committed by a coworker.
43. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Claudia Withers, Preventing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, in
AvOIDING AND LrIGATING SExuAL HARAssmENT CLAIMs 1997, at 131, 137-41 (PLI, Litig.
& Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 567, 1997); John L. Valentino, An Effective
Employer Response to Complaints of Sexual Harassment, 68 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36, 38 (Apr.
1996); Wayne T. McGraw, Investigating Sexual Harassment: A Practical Primer for the
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Even where an employer implements and enforces such a policy,
however, it still will be held liable for a sexually hostile work environment
created by a supervisor so long as the victimized employee properly follows
the grievance procedures provided for in the policy and takes reasonable
steps to avoid the harassment. Since part of the employer's obligation is to
ensure that victimized employees are aware of their rights and
responsibilities under Title VII, few employees who complain about a
supervisor's sexual harassment will "unreasonably fail to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise. '' 6  For just as the Supreme Court's holdings in
Ellerth and Faragher provide an incentive to employers to adopt formal
sexual harassment policies to limit their liability exposure, they also
provide an incentive to harassed employees to utilize such policies to
preclude their employers' affirmative defense to liability. Thus, except in
rare cases where the harassed employee completely neglects to fulfill his or
her obligations under Title VII, the employer will be held liable for a
sexually hostile work environment created by a supervisor, regardless of
whether the employer knew about the harassment or acted reasonably
under the circumstances. Practically speaking, then, the Court has
fashioned a rule of strict employer liability for all supervisory sexual
harassment.47 The Court's holdings in Ellerth and Faragher, therefore, are
in considerable tension with its earlier holding in Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson 5 that "employers are [not] always automatically liable for
Corporate Lawyer, 40 LOY. L. REV. 97, 104-10 (1994).
For cases discussing the employer's standard of care under Title VII, see Adler v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 673-78 (10th Cir. 1998); Bonenberger v. Plymouth
Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 26-27 (3d Cir. 1997); Fleming v. Boeing Co., 120 F.3d 242, 246-47
(11th Cir. 1997); Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 807-08 (5th Cir.
1996); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431-33 (7th Cir. 1995); Fuller v. City
of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1528-29 (9th Cir. 1995).
46. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293.
47. Because the Court's holdings in Ellerth and Faragher are expressly limited to cases
of supervisory hostile work environment sexual harassment, the negligence rule uniformly
applied by the federal circuit courts in Title VII cases involving coworker hostile work
environment sexual harassment remains in full force. Compare Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267
("Negligence sets a minimum standard for employer liability under Title VII."), with Adler
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 673 (10th Cir. 1998); Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
121 F.3d 642, 647 (11th Cir. 1997); Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d
Cir. 1997); Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 1997); Perry v. Harris
Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997); Hirras v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.,
95 F.3d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 1996); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir.
1996); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Spicer v. Virginia Dep't of
Corrections, 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 508
(9th Cir. 1994); Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 804 (6th Cir. 1994);
Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 900-01 (1st Cir. 1988).
48. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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sexual harassment by their supervisors.
' 49
II. APPLYING THE ELLERTH-FARAGHER PARADIGM
To illustrate the impact of the Supreme Court's recent sexual
harassment decisions on prior Title VII caselaw more clearly , I will apply
the Ellerth-Faragher paradigm to the facts of Kauffman v. Allied Signal,
Inc.50 and Pfau v. Reed,51 two recent cases in which the employer was
found not liable for a sexually hostile work environment created by the
plaintiff's supervisor. Under the new rule articulated by the Court in
Ellerth and Faragher, however, if the same employers were sued today
under the same set of circumstances, they almost certainly would be held
liable.
In Kauffman, the plaintiff worked as a machine operator at Allied
Signal's Autolite Division plant in Fostoria, Ohio.52 In early 1988, she took
a medical leave of absence to have breast enlargement surgery.53 The
plaintiff "considered this a very private matter and told only a few close
friends, including co-workers, about her surgery."54 Nonetheless, when the
plaintiff returned to work on April 11, 1988, her supervisor touched her left
breast and asked her, "Why didn't you tell me you were getting new tits?
When do I get to see them?"55 The supervisor then tried to look down the
plaintiffs blouse, but the plaintiff pushed him away, telling him, "That's
enough.,1 6 The next day, the supervisor reassigned the plaintiff from her
regular machine to a manual press that was more difficult to operate. 7
When a coworker asked him why he had done this, the supervisor replied,
"I put her on [the manual press] for punishment because she wouldn't show
me her tits."58
49. Id. at 72; see also Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2274 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting the
Court's holding as "a product of willful policymaking, pure and simple"). Justice Thomas
endorsed the position previously taken by a majority of the federal circuit courts that an
employer is liable for a sexually hostile work environment created by a supervisor "if, and
only if, the plaintiff proves that the employer was negligent in permitting the supervisor's
conduct to occur." Id. at 2271. Justice Thomas emphasized that this is the standard applied
in cases involving charges of racial harassment, see id. at 2272, and argued that an
employer's liability under Title VII should not "depend upon whether a sexually or racially
hostile work environment is alleged." Id. at 2271.
50. 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992).
51. 125 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1997).






58. Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 180.
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The final incidents of harassment occurred on April 13, 1988. While
the plaintiff was working at her regular machine, the supervisor threw a
spark plug insulator at her, hitting her on her right hip.5 9  Later that
evening, the supervisor ordered another employee to ask the plaintiff "to
show you her tits, 6 ° which the employee did. After the incident, the
plaintiff "became hysterical and started crying.",61 The plaintiff then
reported the supervisor's behavior to her union representative, who brought
her complaint to the attention of management. 62 After being confronted
with the plaintiff's allegations, the supervisor was terminated on April 14,
1988, for violating Allied Signal's written policy against sexual
harassment.63
Both at trial and on appeal, Allied Signal did not dispute that the
plaintiff had been subjected to a sexually hostile work environment by her
supervisor.64 The only contested issue was whether the company should be
held liable for the supervisor's actions. 65 The Sixth Circuit held that it
should not.66 In reaching its decision, the Sixth Circuit applied the now-
obsolete rule that an employer is liable for a sexually hostile work
environment created by one of its supervisors only if the employer fails to
respond promptly and adequately to stop the harassment.67 Since Allied
Signal, upon learning of the harassment, "immediately fired the offending
supervisor to correct the hostile working environment which he [had]
created," the Sixth Circuit concluded that the company was "protected from
liability."
68
In sharp contrast with the Sixth Circuit's decision under prior case
law, application of the new Ellerth-Faragher paradigm to the facts of
Kauffman suggests that in today's Title VII environment, Allied Signal
would be held liable for the supervisor's conduct. As explained previously,
under the Court's holding in Ellerth and Faragher, an employer is
59. See id. at 180.
60. Id. at 181.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See id. Allied Signal first adopted its written policy against sexual harassment in
1981. The policy encourages employees to report complaints of sexual harassment to
management through the director of employee relations, thereby permitting the victimized
employee to bypass the harassing supervisor or coworker. Id.
64. See Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 182.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 184.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 185. As for whether Allied Signal was liable for the supervisor's actions
under a theory of quid pro quo sexual harassment, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district
court's award of summary judgment in favor of Allied Signal and remanded for further
proceedings to determine if the supervisor's act of reassigning the plaintiff to the manual
press was a sufficient job detriment to trigger quid pro quo liability. See id. at 187.
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automatically liable to an employee subjected to a sexually hostile work
environment by a supervisor unless the employer can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence both that the employer "exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior" and that the plaintiff employee "unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise., 69 In this case, it is clear that Allied
Signal responded promptly and reasonably to the plaintiffs allegations of
sexual harassment by her supervisor. It is equally clear, however, that the
plaintiff reported the supervisor's behavior to the appropriate authorities
within a reasonable period of time and that she in no way contributed to her
own victimization. In these circumstances, the new Ellerth-Faragher
paradigm would require that Allied Signal be held liable for the
supervisor's conduct.
Another example in which applying the Ellerth-Faragher paradigm
results in a different outcome is Pfau v. Reed.70 In Pfau, the plaintiff
worked for the Defense Contract Audit Agency.7' In October 1992, after
eight years with the Agency, she transferred into a new work group.72 The
plaintiff's new supervisor "immediately began making 'lewd and
suggestive comments' to her and 'request[ing] sexually provocative
behavior from' her.' 73 The plaintiff steadfastly rejected the supervisor's
advances and refused to comply with his demands that they become
intimate.74 In December 1992, she filed charges of sexual harassment
against the supervisor with the Agency. Upon receiving the plaintiff's
complaint, the Agency conducted a full investigation.75 As part of the
investigation, the supervisor was counseled by the Agency's local branch
manager who admonished him against "engag[ing] in any activity which
69. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93. Recall that no
affirmative defense is available to the employer where the supervisor's harassment
culminates in a "tangible employment action." Id. In Kauffman, it was disputed whether
the supervisor's act of reassigning the plaintiff to the manual press constituted such an
action (referred to in Kauffman as a "tangible job detriment"). See Kauffman, 970 F.2d at
186-87. If reassigning the plaintiff to the manual press were considered a tangible
employment action within the meaning of Ellerth and Faragher, then Allied Signal would
be strictly liable for the supervisor's behavior.




74. See id. at 930-31. The plaintiff did not suffer any tangible employment actions as a
result of her refusal to submit to her supervisor's advances. Consequently, this was not a
case of quid pro quo sexual harassment subjecting the Agency to strict liability for the
supervisor's conduct. See discussion supra, Part II.B.
75. See Pfau, 125 F.3d at 940-41.
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might in any way be considered unwelcome sexual harassment.' 76 The
plaintiff acknowledged in her deposition that no further acts of harassment
involving the supervisor thereafter occurred.
Based on these facts, the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the Agency on the plaintiff's Title VII claims. 77 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the
Agency should have known about the supervisor's harassment prior to the
filing of her complaint and that no genuine issue of material fact existed as
to the sufficiency of the Agency's remedial efforts.78 Under the new rule
set forth in Ellerth and Faragher, however, this is only the first step in the
employer's affirmative defense to liability for a supervisor's sexual
harassment of a subordinate employee. The second step involves
demonstrating that the plaintiff-employee "unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise." 79 As in Kauffman, the plaintiff in
Pfau properly reported the supervisor's behavior in accordance with the
Agency's grievance procedures and in no way encouraged his unwanted
attentions. Unless a factfinder were to decide that the two-month interval
between the initial episodes of harassment and the filing of the plaintiffs
complaint represented an unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiff in
reporting the supervisor's behavior, under the new Ellerth-Faragher
paradigm the Agency would be held liable for the supervisor's conduct.
As these examples demonstrate, the Court's holdings in Ellerth and
Faragher have made it much easier to hold an employer liable under Title
VII for a supervisor's sexual harassment of a subordinate employee.80 One
consequence is that there may be greater numbers of sexual harassment
76. Id. at 941.
77. See id. at 932.
78. See id. at 938-41.
79. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93. This prong of the
employer's affirmative defense is certain to be controversial because it raises the specter of
judges and juries "blaming the victim" for a supervisor's sexual harassment. This is so
because, even where an employee is sexually harassed by his or her supervisor, the
employer can escape liability under Title VII so long as it takes reasonable steps to prevent
or stop the harassment and it proves that the employee failed to report the harassment in a
timely manner or otherwise contributed to his or her own victimization, for example, by
voluntarily socializing with the harasser. See generally Brown v. Perry, No. 97-1501, 1999
WL 504814 (4th Cir. July 14, 1999) (holding that the plaintiff acted unreasonably when she
did not attempt to avoid her harasser); Perry v. Harris Chernin, 126 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th
Cir. 1997)(affirming directed verdict in favor of the defendant where the plaintiff "failed to
do her[]" part by reporting supervisor's harassment before quitting her job).
80. The plaintiffs attorney in Ellerth described the Court's ruling as "stunningly
favorable to the employee." Lynn Sweet, Landmark Ruling on Sex Harassment, CHm. SUN-
TnviEs, June 27, 1998, at 1; see also Kimberly Blanton & Chana Schoenberger, Jump in Sex-
Bias Cases Expected After Decision, BOSTON GLOBE, June 27, 1998, at Fl (noting the
"increased ease of making-and winning a sexual harassment case").
316
ELLERTH AND FARAGHER
cases in the future .8 Not only may more sexual harassment lawsuits be
ified, but winning on summary judgment "will become virtually
impossible.,12 Moreover "companies will be under more pressure to settle
weak claims simply to avoid the overall cost of litigation or the risk of
bringing the case to a jury.' s Another consequence is that employers may
become overly zealous in their efforts to stop sexual harassment before it
starts, since the only sure-fire method of avoiding Title VII liability is to
prevent the harassment from ever occurring 4
IT[. CONCLUSION
In summary, the Supreme Court's decisions in Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerths5 and Faragher v. City of Boca Ratons6 have wrought
significant changes in the law governing claims of supervisory sexual
harassment under Title VII. In particular, the Court has made it much
easier to hold an employer liable for a sexually hostile work environment
created by a supervisor. Henceforth, so long as the harassed employee
timely reports the offending supervisor and takes reasonable steps to stop
or otherwise avoid the harassment, the employer will be held liable for the
supervisor's actions, regardless of the level of care exercised by the
81. See Edward Felsenthal, Rulings Open Way for Sex-Harass Cases, WALL ST. J., June
29, 1998, at A3; David G. Savage, High Court Holds Employers to Strict Harassment Rules,
L.A. TamS, June 27, 1998, at Al. Currently, more than 15,000 sexual harassment lawsuits
are filed each year. See Clinton's Crisis, Tam, Mar. 23, 1998, at 48.
82. Dominic Bencivenga, Looking for Guidance: High Court Rulings Leave Key Terms
Undefined, N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1998, at 5. See generally, Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d
884, 888-89 (8th Cir. 1998) (reversing summary judgment in favor of defendant in part on
grounds that whether defendant took prompt and appropriate remedial action and whether
plaintiff's conduct was reasonable were questions best left to factfinder).
83. Bencivenga, supra note 82 at 5; see also Supreme Court Rulings to Affect
Harassment Covers, BEST'S INS. NEwS, July 2, 1998.
84. See, e.g., Anita K. Blair, Harassment Law: More Confused Than Ever, WALL ST. J.,
July 8, 1999, at A14 ("Employers trying to fulfill their duty to prevent harassment will find
they must either institute totalitarian measures-attempting to monitor and control every
encounter between employees within (and even outside) the workplace-or else give up and
buy various forms of insurance."); Marcia Coyle, Sex Harassment Redefined, NAT'L L.J.,
July 6, 1998, at Al ("Employers, more than ever, are going to have to have as vigorous anti-
harassment training and policies as they possibly can.") (attribution omitted); Editorial,
More Harassment, WASH. POST, June 28, 1998, at C6 ("there is reason to fear that
employers will interpret 'reasonable care' to include practices that are at odds with civil
liberties and free-if sometimes unpleasant-speech"). See also Supreme Court Rulings to
Affect Harassment Covers, supra note 83 (claiming that the rulings "essentially require that
companies have zero-tolerance antiharassment policies"); Edward Felsenthal, Rulings Open
Way for Sex-Harass Cases, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1998, at A3 (stating that the "rulings will
create a huge incentive for companies to establish tough antiharassment programs").
85. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
86. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
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employer. As I have argued, the Court has thus moved quite far towards
adopting a rule of strict employer liability whenever a supervisor sexually
harasses a subordinate. While the precise impact this will have on the day-
to-day world of Title VII litigation remains to be seen, it appears likely that
both the number of cases filed, as well as the cost to employers in terms of
settlements and verdicts, will increase substantially.
